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Classical one-time-pad key can only be used once. We show in this Letter that with quantum
mechanical information media classical one-time-pad key can be repeatedly used. We propose a
specific realization using single photons. The reason why quantum mechanics can make the classical
one-time-pad key repeatable is that quantum states can not be cloned and eavesdropping can be
detected by the legitimate users. This represents a significant difference between classical cryptog-
raphy and quantum cryptography and provides a new tool in designing quantum communication
protocols and flexibility in practical applications.
Note added: This work was submitted to PRL as LU9745 on 29 July 2004, and the decision was
returned on 11 November 2004, which advised us to resubmit to some specialized journal, probably,
PRA, after revision. We publish it here in memory of Prof. Fu-Guo Deng (1975.11.12-2019.1.18),
from Beijing Normal University, who died on Jan 18, 2019 after two years heroic fight with pancreatic
cancer. In this work, we designed a protocol to use a classical one-time-pad key of 2N length to
prepare a sequence of N single photons in |0 >, |1 >, |+ >, |− > states and encode secret message
using unitary operations I (for 0), sigma-y (for 1). The bit string can be reused. The essential
idea was proposed in November 1982, by Charles H. Bennett, Gilles Brassard, Seth Breidbart,
which was rejected by Fifteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, and remained
unpublished until 2014, when they published the article, Quantum Cryptography II: How to re-use
a one-time pad safely even if P=NP, Natural Computing (2014) 13:453-458, DOI 10.1007/s11047-
014-9453-6. We worked out this idea independently. This work has not been published, and was in
cooperated into quant-ph 706.3791 (Kai Wen, Fu Guo Deng, Gui Lu Long, Secure Reusable Base-
String in Quantum Key Distribution), and quant-ph 0711.1642 (Kai Wen, Fu-Guo Deng, Gui Lu
Long, Reusable Vernam Cipher with Quantum Media).
Quantum mechanics predictions can sometimes contra-
dict our experiences and our classical physics knowledge
with surprises. It is well-known that quantum mechan-
ics allows for efficient solution to difficult problems in
classical computation, for instance in Shor algorithm[1]
and Grover’s algorithm [2]. In the fields of cryptography,
quantum key distribution(QKD) provides uncondition-
ally secure distribution of secret keys between two re-
mote parties[3–6]. Since the early QKD protocols [3, 7],
research in QKD has been progressing very fast[8]. The
secure key produced from QKD can be combined with
the Vernam one-time-pad[9], which has been proven un-
conditionally secure[10]. In the Vernam cipher scheme,
the secret key and the message have the same length,
and the cipher text is the simple modulo 2 sum of the
message and the keys.
The Vernam one-time-pad key can only be used once in
classical cryptography. To an eavesdropper Eve, the mes-
sageM is unknown to her, and the entropy of the message
space is H(M). Suppose Eve gets hold of the ciphertext
C and her entropy about the M becomes HC(M). With
perfect secrecy, H(M) = HC(M), i.e., the possession of
the ciphertext does not provides Eve any new informa-
tion about the message. Vernam cipher is just such a
system. However when the same key is used twice, the
perfect secrecy condition is no longer satisfied. For in-
stance if the first message were obtained by Eve due to
one reason or another, she would have complete knowl-
edge of the key by subtracting the intercepted ciphertext
with the message. Hence the repeated use of the one-
time-pad key in classical cryptography is terrifying and
there have been hard lessons in history of the disastrous
consequences of the repeated use of a one-time-pad key.
However, in this Letter, we will show that classical one-
time-pad can be used repeatedly with quantum mechan-
ical carriers with unconditional security. The essential
cause for the repeated use of the key is the inability of
Eve to intercept the ciphertext and the capability of com-
municating parties to detect Eve. The significance of this
work is twofold. First, the repeated use of a classical one-
time-pad key itself represents conceptual liberation from
the constraints laid down by classical cryptography. This
may provide new avenue for cryptography. Second, this
property may help present studies of quantum communi-
cations, both in protocol design and in practical realiza-
tions.
First we briefly check the basic ingredients in a QKD
protocol that makes QKD secure. They are: 1) the quan-
2tum non-cloning theorem[11]; 2) quantum state collapse
after measurement; 3) non-locality of entangled compos-
ite quantum systems[12];(4) classical randomness. Usu-
ally a QKD protocol involves simultaneously more than
one of the ingredients mentioned above. For example, the
BB84 QKD protocol uses ingredient 2) and 4). The cur-
rent practice in quantum communication is that first a
common key between two users is established by a QKD,
and then the message is encrypted with the key using
the Vernam cipher. The ciphertext is transmitted from
one user to the other user through a classical channel.
Recently, some authors have proposed to transmit se-
cret messages directly through a quantum channel[13–
16], which condenses the two transmissions into a single
one. In these schemes, the key is used only once where
in the former the ciphertext is transmitted through a
classical channel, whereas in the latter the ciphertext is
transmitted through a quantum channel.
Suppose Alice and Bob have already a sequence of com-
mon secret key, and they have access to a quantum chan-
nel. Can they use the key repeatedly? We will show with
a explicit protocol that the answer is yes.
Like the BB84 QKD protocol, there are two sets
of measuring-basis(MB), the plus-measuring-basis (plus-
MB):
|H〉 = |0〉 , |V 〉 = |1〉 ,
and the cross-measuring-basis (cross-MB), i.e.
|u〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |d〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉),
where |H〉 and |V 〉 are the horizontal and vertical polar-
ization states respectively. The quantum crypto-system
contains six steps, the schematic illustration is shown in
Fig.1. We assume ideal noiseless channel. For complete-
ness, we also include the step to establish a common key
sequence. We assume that Alice is transmitting a mes-
sage to Bob.
Step 1: Establishing a classical one-time-pad key. Al-
ice and Bob first establish a sequence of secret key. There
are various means to achieve this. One natural choice is
to use the BB84 QKD protocol[3] to produce a common
secret key between Alice and Bob. The result is a se-
quence of random binary numbers.
Step 2: Modified message sequence preparation. A
secret message can be translated into a sequence of Nm
binary numbers, and the message sequence is denoted as
Mm. The modified message sequence contains the mes-
sage sequence and a sampling sequence of binary num-
bers. Alice chooses a sufficient large sequence of Ns ran-
dom binary numbers as sampling bits, denoted by MS.
Alice inserts each of these Ns binary numbers into the
message bit sequence at random positions. This com-
prises a modified message sequence of N = Nm + Ns
binary numbers. This modified message sequence is de-
noted as MN . Alice records the position and the value
of these Ns binary numbers in this modified message se-
quence MN .
Step3: Encoding the modified message sequence with
the classical one-time-pad key. Take 2N = 2(Nm + Ns)
binary numbers from the one-time-pad key to form a
basis-key sequence, denoted by QN . Alice and Bob
agree beforehand that 00, 11, 01 and 10 in the classi-
cal one-time-pad base-key correspond to quantum states
|H〉, |V 〉, |u〉 and |d〉 respectively, namely
00→ |H〉, 11→ |V 〉, 01→ |u〉, 10→ |d〉. (1)
Alice prepares a sequence of N single photons in states
according to the respective values in the basis-key QN .
The encoding of the modified message sequence is real-
ized by two unitary operations
U0 = I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|, (2)
U1 = iσy= |0〉 〈1| − |1〉 〈0| . (3)
If the i-th bit in the modified message sequence is a 0,
then Alice performs unitary operation U0 on the i-th sin-
gle photon, and if the i-th bit in the modified message
sequence is a 1, then Alice performs U1 operation on the
i-th single photon. The nice feature of this set of en-
coding operation is they do not change the states in one
measuring-basis into another measuring-basis,
U1 |0〉 = − |1〉 , U1 |1〉 = |0〉 ,
U1 |u〉 = |d〉 , U1 |d〉 = − |u〉 . (4)
After encoding the corresponding bit value in the mod-
ified message sequence on the single photon, Alice sends
the single photon to Bob. The single photons now carry
the ciphertext.
Step 4: Decrypting the ciphertext of the modified
message sequence by Bob. After receiving the single pho-
tons, Bob measures each single photon in appropriate
measuring-basis as Bob has the same one-time-pad key
as Alice so he knows the state of each photon before the
encoding. After the measurement, Bob knows the en-
coding operation on each photon, and hence knows the
corresponding bit value in the modified message sequence
MN .
Step 5: Alice and Bob check eavesdropping and Bob
obtains the message sequence. Alice announces publicly
the positions of the sampling bits in the modified mes-
sage sequence. With this information, Bob publicly an-
nounces the bits values of these sampling bits, that is the
encoding operations of the sampling photons. It should
be emphasized that the information about the states of
the photons are not disclosed, either before the encoding
nor after the encoding. Alice then compares these re-
sults with her own values, and she determines the error
rate. With the error rate, she can judge whether there
is eavesdropping in the transmission. Under ideal condi-
tion, there should be no error if there is no eavesdropping.
3If the error rate is high, then there is eavesdropper in the
transmission. They halt the process.
Step 6: Constructing a classical one-time-pad key
from the used classical one-time-pad key. Under ideal
condition, if the error rate is zero, then Alice and Bob
can drop the sampling bits that have been chosen for
eavesdropping and keep the remaining bits in the clas-
sical one-time-pad keys as a new classical one-time-pad
key to be used later.
We now discuss the security of this reusable classical
one-time-pad key, Qk. We do not prove the security here,
but rather point only to the similarity with the classical
one-time pad [9] and BB84 QKD [3] which are known to
be unconditionally secure[4–6, 10].
First we notice that the encoding of secret messages
in the step 3 is identical to the process in a classical
one-time-pad where the text is encrypted with a ran-
dom key as the states of the photons in the quantum key
is completely random to Eve, hence the conditional en-
tropy of the message Hc(M) is identical to the entropy
of the message itself H(M), Hc(M) = H(M), i.e., the
access of the ciphertext by Eve does not increase any
information about the message. This is completely se-
cure according to Shannon [10]. However, as has been
discussed in Ref. [16], the quantum crypto-system, is
even more secure than the classical one-time-pad scheme
in the sense that Eve can not even get the cipher-text
completely, as she does not know the photons’ MBs, and
any eavesdropping will 1) destroys the quantum state;
2) be detected by Alice and Bob. Thus the security of
this quantum crypto-system depends entirely on the se-
curity of the quantum key. If this one-time-pad key were
lost to Eve, she could simply measure each of the sin-
gle photon with the correct measuring-basis and escape
detection. We will discuss the security issue of this quan-
tum crypto-system. We limit our discussion to individual
attack first [17–19] and discuss the security of Qk .
In the ideal condition, any eavesdropping done by Eve
will be detected by Alice and Bob. Moreover, Eve can
get nothing about the ciphertext. The process for eaves-
dropping check in this quantum crypto-system is similar
as that for BB84 QKD protocol[3] in which the optimal
individual attack of Eve can be realized by an unitary
operation UTB on the travelling photon sent to Bob with
a probe whose initial state is |0〉, i.e.,
UTB |ξ〉 |0〉 = |ξ〉 |0〉 , (5)
UTB
∣∣ξ〉 |0〉 = cos θ ∣∣ξ〉 |0〉+ sin θ |ξ〉 |1〉 (6)
where |ξ〉 and ∣∣ξ〉 are two eigenvectors of two-level op-
erator, such as σz or σx, and θ ∈ [0, pi/4] represents the
strength of the eavesdropping [18, 20, 21]. The average
mutual information IAE between Eve and Alice is limited
to[18],
IAE ≤ 1
2
φ
[
2
√
D(1 −D)
]
≡ I0 (7)
where the function φ [x] = (1 + x) log2(1 + x) + (1 −
x) log2(1 − x), and D = 12 sin2 θ is the error rate intro-
duced by Eve’s action in the result.
It is useful to emphasize that I0 is the information
bound Eve can obtain about the encoding operation sent
by Alice under the condition that Alice and Bob publish
the information about the measuring-basis. When D =
0.25, I0 ≈ 0.645 is the maximum.
In the protocol described above, Alice does not publish
any information of the single photons of the message, and
Eve’s information I
′
AE is less than I0
I
′
AE < IAE ≤ I0 < 1 = IAB , (8)
where IAB is the mutual information between Alice and
Bob. It is obvious that Eve cannot get a useful informa-
tion about the message and her action will be detected.
When producing the one-time-pad from the used one,
Alice and Bob discardMS sequence which has been pub-
licly announced. They use the one-time pad repeatedly
only when they ascertain the quantum channel is secure.
So Eve can get nothing about the message without infor-
mation about it.
A special case is that Eve eavesdrops the quantum
channel with some information about the secret message
known in advance. The goal is to obtain some informa-
tion about the classical one-time key. It is of interest that
even though Eve knows the message before hand and at-
tacks the quantum communication with cipher-text strat-
egy, she still cannot get the one-time-pad key completely
as she cannot get the information about the quantum
states of single photons without their MBs. This is cer-
tainly different from that in classical cryptography. In
this time, the information I
′′
AE is just what Eve can get
about the basis-key of the single photon when she knows
the encoding operation in advance.
Similar to the BB84 QKD scheme in which Eve wants
to obtain some information about the raw key and mon-
itors the quantum channel[22], Eve eavesdrops the quan-
tum communication for the classical one-time pad key.
The mutual information I
′′
AE is just the information that
Eve can get about the measuring-basis of the single pho-
tons. Eve can get more information about the raw key
in BB84 QKD than that in this crypto-system for the
MBs of the single photons as she can do exact measure-
ment on her probe system and get the result with the
MBs published by Alice and Bob in BB84 QKD, which
does not happen in this crypto-system. So we can get
the relation[22]
I
′′
AE < IAEBB84 ≤ 1−log2(1+ε˜)+
ε˜
1 + ε˜
log2 ε˜ ≡ I1, (9)
ε˜ ≥

1− 4
√(√
2− 8Dm
)
Dm
1− 8√2Dm


2
(10)
4FIG. 1. Illustration of a repeated classical one-time-pad
crypto-system.
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where IAEBB84 is mutual information between Alice and
Eve in BB84 QKD, the maximum value is Dm ≤ 0.25.
As pointed out in Ref. [22], for small Dm,
I
′′
AE <
4
√
2
ln 2
Dm, (11)
where ln2 is the natural logarithm of 2. For example,
when Dm ≤ 0.05, I ′′AE < 0.41. As discussed above, Eve
cannot steals the secret message if she only obtains the
information IMB , but it is helpful for her to eavesdrop
the quantum signal in the next time. This is just the
reason that our quantum crypto-system can repeatedly
use the quantum key conditionally.
In ideal implementation of this quantum crypto-
system, single photon source is required. A single photon
source is principally available[23]. Even without single
photon source, ideal channels ad perfect detectors, this
repeatable one-time-pad scheme can also be used. Er-
ror correcting techniques are necessary then. There have
already been quite a few good correcting codes, for in-
stance, in references[24–26]. Comparing with the quan-
tum one-time-pad secure direct communication scheme in
Ref.[16], the advantage of this protocol is obvious: there
is no need to store quantum states, and the single pho-
tons need be sent only in one-way, as compared with that
in Ref.[16] with two-ways.
With a noise quantum channel, this crypto-system can
be used to quantum direct communication with some
other quantum and classical techniques if the noise is
low. For example Alice and Bob do privacy amplifica-
tion [27] on the classical one-time-pad key for cancelling
the information of the key leaked to Eve. The process is
just a map in which k bits of key is changed to k′, where
k > k′. Surely, this crypto-system maybe not suitable
for direct communication if the noise and loss are high
as there are no advantages compared with QKD. In the
condition, it is suitable for QKD similar to the ways in
Refs [28, 29].
To summarize, this quantum crypto-system can be
used for transmission of secret message securely, same
as QSDC even though it is just a prototype. Also, it
can be used for QKD unconditionally securely. In this
quantum crypto-system, the quantum key, a sequence of
the quantum states of single photons can be used repeat-
edly and is mapped to a classical key which is stored in
classical way.
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